Apartheid cartography: the political anthropology and spatial effects of international diplomacy in Bosnia

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Abstract

International diplomacy has been one of a number of practices which have performatively constituted “Bosnia” as a particular place with specific people, so that it could be rendered as a problem requiring a particular solution. Even when, as in the case of the Dayton accords, negotiators claim they have desired the reintegration of Bosnia, their reliance on a powerful set of assumptions about identity, territoriality and politics—a particular political anthropology—has meant the ethnic partition of a complex and heterogeneous society is the common product of the international community’s efforts. Paying attention to the role of cartography, this paper explores the apartheid-like logic of international diplomacy’s political anthropology, the way this logic overrode non-nationalist options and legitimised exclusivist projects during the war, and considers the conundrum this bequeaths Bosnia in the post-Dayton period as a number of significant local forces seek to overcome division.

This article is accompanied by a web-site which presents the relevant maps from the periods of international diplomacy discussed here, along with a further commentary. Referred to in the article as Campbell (1999), this web-site can be accessed at http://www.newcastle.ac.uk/~npol/maps/bosnia © 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

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Bosnia and the Bantustan analogy

In the early 1990s, the pillars of South Africa’s post-war regime of grand apartheid were being dismantled, among them the homelands or Bantustans constructed for...
the majority African population. Embodying the intersection of racial and spatial relations, the homelands territorialised separate development and were predicated upon the novel division of the African population into so-called ethnic groups (Campbell, 1999:Section 2(ii); Drummond, 1991:369; Mare, 1993; Norval, 1996:103, 142–43). Independent only in the eyes of some homeland leaders and the white South African government, the Bantustans were part of an effort to give apartheid a positive gloss, and were rationalised as the place in which different ethnic cultures could be preserved so that African “nations” could develop (Nixon, 1994:161–62; Norval, 1996:160). They helped associate the logic of apartheid with “fixity . . . and attempts to petrify racial and ethnic identities in a condition of timeless purity and physical isolation” (Nixon, 1994:4–5; Norval, 1994).

As part of the progression to a democratic and de-racialised South Africa, the country was re-mapped through the re-incorporation of the Bantustans and the delineation of a new provincial structure which made difficult the association of identity and territory (Manzo, 1996:74). Those who sought to resist these changes argued that the violence which accompanied demands for ethnic self-determination in Central and Eastern Europe—most notably, the former Yugoslavia—could be seen as “belated vindication of ‘separate development’”. Taking their cue from Balkan nationalists advocating ethnic political spaces, a number of conservatives opposed to the ANC maintained that only an ethnically divided polity could contain the violence which supposedly inhered in a heterogeneous society (Nixon, 1994:237–40).

The transmission of analogies between the former Yugoslavia—especially Bosnia—and South Africa has not, however, been a one-way street. Critics of the Dayton accord, which brought an end to the fighting in Bosnia, have argued that in contrast to the unitary and non-racial structure of South Africa post-1994 elections, the situation of Bosnia post-1995 agreement resembles in large part the political logic abandoned in southern Africa (Borden, 1998). According to Zoran Pajić (1998:137)—a former law professor from the University of Sarajevo and member of the Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Southern Africa at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights—the Dayton accord “proclaim[s] democracy while entrenching apartheid structures and ethnic-based parties”.

This assessment is in contradistinction to that of both the public presentation of Dayton and those associated with the Dayton accord. The officially-propagated understanding of Dayton is that it calls for the restoration of a unified, multiethnic Bosnia whatever the odds. Most media narratives have reiterated this notion of “the Dayton spirit”, understood as the international struggle for unity in the face of the local drive for division (The Independent, 1996). Richard Holbrooke, the chief American negotiator of the treaty, argues that it both ended the war and “established [Bosnia as] a single, multiethnic country” (Holbrooke, 1998:335). This political goal was not overriding, however. Observing that “no vital national interest of the United States was directly affected by whether Bosnia was one, two, or three countries”, Holbrooke (1998:363–64) argues that the United States did not oppose a voluntary change in the international boundaries in Bosnia-Herzegovina or its eventual division into more than one country—if that were the desire of a majority of each of the three ethnic groups at some future date.
This flexibility notwithstanding, Holbrooke nonetheless stresses that for his negotiating team, Cyprus, with its temporary cease-fire line later inscribed as the marker of partition, was the outcome to avoid (Holbrooke, 1998:133, 226; Campbell, 1999:Section 2(iii)). However, according to Radha Kumar (1997:22), “Cyprus” is exactly what Bosnia has become, for Dayton is “a so-called peace accord that is in reality a partition agreement with an exit clause for outside powers”. But in Holbrooke’s eyes (Holbrooke, 1998:361, 383n), if elements of partition have been fomented by Dayton, they are a product of problems with the accord’s implementation rather than its purpose or provisions.

**Dayton and the “inevitability” of partition**

The violence in Bosnia, its cessation through the Dayton accord, and the differing readings of the accord’s political goals, have prompted an extended debate about the nature of so-called ethnic conflict and its resolution. The major fault-line in this discussion is between those who think that the pursuit of an integrated, non-nationalist Bosnia is ethically and historically sound, thereby warranting a commitment of resources, and those who regard this aim as misplaced if not wholly mistaken, and advocate instead the partition of Bosnia (Holbrooke, 1998:362–63). The primary purpose of this paper is to provide, within the context of what international diplomacy made of Bosnia, a conceptual perspective for this debate so as to question the naturalisation of partition as the preferred option for Bosnia.

The argument to be made here runs counter to a substantial body of opinion. More often than not, influential figures have expounded the view that the only realistic outcome in a situation such as Bosnia is—in a move that conflates “ethnic” with “national”—partition along ethnic lines so as to create separate national spaces. Public plans for the partition of Bosnia date from the Spring 1991, and came to prominence after supposedly secret meetings between Presidents Slobodan Milošević of Serbia and Montenegro, and Franjo Tudjman of Croatia, during which they discussed the fate of Bosnia (Klemenčić, 1994:28). The declaration of Serbian Autonomous Regions in Bosnia from the Spring of 1991, matched in part by the formation of Croatian communities in Bosanska Posavina and Herceg-Bosna later that year (the latter of which remains in existence despite Dayton), put elements of those proposals into practice. Unofficial “Muslim” plans for partition—denounced at the time by the Bosnian authorities—were publicised at the same time in the Sarajevo media (Klemenčić, 1994: 30–34, 42; Campbell, 1999:Section 2(iv)).

For such proposals to succeed on the international stage, however, requires more than their local sponsorship. As Christopher Hitchens (1997:149) has remarked, “partition requires partitionism and partitionists”, forces which claim the mantle of fatalism and inevitability. Not surprisingly, then, the enthusiasm for partition of Croatian and Serbian protagonists was matched to a considerable extent and legitimated by
academics and officials outside the region, most of whom have little or no experience of the region or its people.¹

For example, ever since the Spring of 1993, John Mearsheimer—a prominent neo-realist scholar of international relations—has repeatedly declared that the best and most realistic option for Bosnia is the partition of the country into ethnically homogenous states. Mearsheimer argued that through the redrawing of boundaries and the forced transfer of populations, the construction of a Bosnian state for Muslims, a Croatian state for Croats and a Serbian state for Serbs is the answer to “intractable ethnic hatreds” (Mearsheimer, 1993, 1997; Mearsheimer and Pape, 1993; Mearsheimer and van Evera, 1995, 1996; Campbell, 1999:Section 2(v)). A number of other American academics and opinion-makers have chimed in with similar views (Kissinger, 1996; O’Hanlon, 1997; Pape, 1998; Steel, 1995; Will, 1995).² Michael Lind (1994) has extended this notion to suggest that partition should no longer be the last resort for Bosnia-like situations, and that when multinational states collapse the United States should in principle advocate the sovereignty of culturally homogenous “national homelands”. All of which strengthens the apartheid connection and is consistent with the historical observation that partition is a colonial practice, one “always made at third-party intervention”, and which fosters the violence it seeks to ameliorate (Kumar, 1997a:140; Kumar, 1997b).³

Those calling for the partition of Bosnia generally assume that the Dayton accord embodies, as Holbrooke maintains, a logic of reintegration and reconstruction rather than division and partition. In this vein, important strains of congressional opinion in the United States concerned about that country’s involvement in the Balkans have called for the renegotiation of the Dayton agreement so as to secure an ethnic partition of Bosnia which would allow the US to withdraw (Hutchison, 1997). There thus appears to be a considerable gulf between the “spirit” of Dayton and those advocating partition.

However, this reading is complicated by what some perceive as an ambiguity within the Dayton accords. Analysts critical of the international community’s policies and opposed to the partitionist option have recognised that there is a structural tension

¹“Significantly, few of the international voices calling for partition have ever spent significant time in Bosnia or among Bosnians, whereas many of those arguing against partition have” (Cousens, 1997:817).

²Even amongst those who profess opposition to partition per se there is often a suggestion for partition of some sort. For example, a former National Security Council co-ordinator of US policy towards Bosnia (Daalder, 1998) argues for the partition of Republika Srpska into two, with the supposedly more moderate western half becoming part of a new integrated Bosnia and the east being recognised as independent. Boyd (1998) and Doder (1997) argue for three ethnic sub-states within a confederal state, seemingly unaware that this was akin to the Cutileiro Statement of Principles (see below). Most perplexing—especially given his other sometimes ethnographically-sensitive analyses—is Hayden’s (Hayden, 1996, 1998) absolutist view that Bosnia divided itself from the elections of 1990 onwards, thereby making partition inevitable such that the international community needs to match its policies accordingly.

³Kumar (1997b) draws a distinction between those partitionists who seek to “divide and rule” (essentially the “locals”) and those who seek to “divide and quit” (the “international community”). In contrast, the argument here maintains that even if intentions differ the partitionist logic overcomes them such that the international community ends up legitimising divide and rule policies.
in the Dayton agreement which means it can be read as favouring either position (Gow, 1997; Sharp, 1998). Depending on the provisions highlighted—either the division of Bosnia into two entities with separate armies, or the goal of an integrated state with shared institutions—both unity and partition can be legitimised (Daalder, 1998).

This argument often concludes with an assertion of culpability for the state of play in Bosnia: those supporting an integrated Bosnia bemoan the international community’s position and argue that overcoming the long-established appeasement strategy by renewing a commitment to those annexes of the Dayton agreement which favour reintegration can bring about a more just peace (Cousens, 1997; Vuillamy, 1998). Those embodying the partitionist position believe Bosnians themselves are to blame for inciting and furthering division, making action on the part of the international community self-defeating and even dangerous (Hutchison, 1997; Mearsheimer, 1997).

In contrast, this paper argues that when the record of international involvement in Bosnia is viewed in conceptual and historical terms, the current struggle in Bosnia over the character of the political options available—in particular, whether partition is inevitable if it does not already exist—is one not readily appreciated solely in terms of political choices in the present freed from the limitations of the past. Calls

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4 Despite references to “the international community,” we should not regard “it” as a coherent subject which is either unified in purpose or exists prior to the practices formulated in its name. In this sense, it is important to see “the international community” performatively constituted through its interventions. For elaborations of the idea of performative constitution of subjectivity in international relations, see Campbell (1998, b) and Weber (1994, 1998).

5 Republika Srpska President Biljana Plavsic, who has received enthusiastic backing from the international community, has spoken of this tension and the version of Dayton to which she subscribes. The Sarajevo paper Oslobodjenje reported on 20 July 1998 that Plavsic declared, during a speech in Banja Luka, that

the main threat to what she called the substance of the Dayton agreement is attempts by the international community to make Bosnia a multi-ethnic society again, as it was before the war. This foreign commitment to multi-ethnicity she dubbed “the spirit of Dayton”. She warned that the Serbs must insist instead on the implementation of what she called the letter of the agreement, which grants specific rights to each ethnic group and to each of the two separate entities, including the Republika Srpska (RFE/RL, 1998)

6 If the term “appeasement” seems too strong, consider Vuillamy’s (Vuillamy, 1998:75–76) defence of the concept, which I endorse:

“Appeasement” is a pejorative and historically tendentious term but it seems a good enough word to describe the three years of diplomat-to-diplomat barter between the leaders of the democratic West and Radovan Karadzic—now a fugitive wanted for genocide—beneath the chandeliers of London, Geneva and New York; or the matey soldier-to-soldier dinners of lamb and suckling pig shared by successive United National generals with their opposite number, General Ratko Mladic—likewise now fugitive and wanted—whose death squads perpetrated the Srebrenica massacre, on his personal orders and in his presence . . . If the term “appeasement” offends, then “toleration” and even “reward” can hardly be contested.
for action have to appreciate that no one begins from a blank slate. While many
would argue that a more forthright commitment to reintegration along non-nationalist
lines should be demanded from all parties, the situation that now exists can only be
understood if we recognise how we got to this point. Overcoming appeasement is
essential, but we have to recognise that appeasement was not a strategy of inaction
per se; it was a strategy to act in minimal ways because of a reliance on certain
assumptions about identity, politics and political space. In this context, it can be
argued that those now fostering the reintegration of the Bosnian polity have to struggle
as much against the divisive legacy, supported by those particular assumptions
about identity, politics and space, bequeathed them by their predecessors as the local
parties they now hold responsible. As a result, this paper argues that Holbrooke’s
sanguinity about the intentions and effects of his diplomatic effort is misplaced,
especially when Dayton is read in the context of the international diplomatic pro-
posals for the resolution of the Bosnian war that preceded it. The problems Dayton
bequeathed to Bosnia are not simply problems of the accord’s (non)implementation.

To make this case, we have to consider what the record of international diplomacy
reveals about the assumptions concerning ethnic conflict in Bosnia relied upon by
both the international community and the self-proclaimed partitionists. To achieve
that, this paper makes an argument in three parts. First, through a documentary
review of the international community’s peace proposals for Bosnia, it will be shown
that the process which culminated in the Dayton agreement, which supposedly dis-
avows partition in favour of unity, goes beyond its ambivalence, and in actuality
foments partition albeit in the name of “multi-ethnicity”. As a result, serious ques-
tions need to asked about the conceptualisation of “multi-ethnicity” invoked by the
international community. Second, it will be argued that the common logic of both
the overtly partitionist argument and the international community’s diplomatic efforts
is achieved through adherence to a contestable political anthropology about Bosnia. Deployed by both the peacemakers and the paramilitaries in Bosnia, this anthro-
pology gives rise to a nationalist imaginary in which there is a nexus between identity
and territory reminiscent of apartheid. And third, although the partitionist logic is
styled as an unfortunate but necessary realism, it will be maintained that it embodies
instead a dangerous idealism that is likely to produce the very outcomes it seeks to
avoid. In partial demonstration of this, the conclusion will reflect on the way the

7 While Holbrooke’s (Holbrooke, 1998) account of the fourteen weeks that encompasses Dayton negoti-
ations is illuminating in its details, it is also revealing in its silences. It contains no conceptual reflections
about the politics of identity implicated in the various diplomatic proposals, and offers no sustained
perspective on the many diplomatic agreements which preceded Dayton and provided its parameters.

8 I use the term “political anthropology” to signify the intersections between conceptual assumptions
about identity, space (often territory) and politics. In this sense, it is related less to traditional conceptions
of political anthropology from within the discipline of anthropology than to thoughts spurred by Todorov’s
reading of Mikhail Bakhtin. There Todorov highlights the notion of “philosophical anthropology” as
referring to Bakhtin’s “general conception of human existence, where the other plays a decisive role.
This is then the fundamental principle: it is impossible to conceive of any being outside of the relations
that link it to the other” (Todorov, 1984: 94). With the term “political anthropology” I am interested in
the way this assumption about being is either recognised or elided in various political arrangements.
parameters of the partitionist logic employed by the peacemakers have largely created the very obstacles the international community, with its recently renewed emphasis on reintegration, now wishes to overcome in Bosnia.

Mapping Bosnia

Of course, international diplomacy is not the only, nor necessarily the most important, site in which a nationalist imaginary has been installed for Bosnia. Paying attention to its role so as to redress partial accounts should not be seen as excusing other parties and other sites, as there are many practices and sites which, although appearing to be constative declarations—claiming to merely describe what is—should be regarded as performative practices—helping to bring into being that which they claim to merely describe (Campbell, 1998; Weber, 1998). For example, the constitutions of the successor states to the former Yugoslavia performatively enact nationalist ideologies (Hayden, 1996a), while academic and media accounts of the violence install ethnicised conceptions (Campbell, 1998a; Ó Tuathail, 1996: ch.6), all the time iterating and reiterating the orientalist character of a long-established discourse about the Balkans (Bakić-Hayden and Hayden, 1992; Todorova, 1997). Importantly, these performative practices of representation do not simply “imagine” one assemblage of identity; they also “un-imagine” another. Representational practices concerned with the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia have, therefore, a double function: they bring into being one conception by simultaneously removing another conception from being. As Robert Hayden (1996:783) writes, “extreme nationalism in the former Yugoslavia had not been only a matter of imagining allegedly ‘primordial’ communities, but rather of making existing heterogeneous ones unimaginable”.

This double function of the representational practices—imagining homogeneity by making heterogeneity unimaginable—is most evident in the centrality of cartography to the various diplomatic efforts designed to resolve the Bosnian war. Indeed, resolutions of the conflict have centred, as Crampton (1996:353) argues, on “the singular cartographic delineation of territory” and the manner in which “the cartographic imagination” has brought a very particular Bosnia into being through its elision of all that is relevant to being but is “unmappable”. Not that this is a limitation of cartography unique to the Bosnian context. As various contributions to the debates in Geography about the status of cartography have demonstrated (Belyea, 1992; Dahl, 1989; Edney, 1993; Harley, 1988, 1989, 1990), maps are exemplary moments that manifest the relationship between power and knowledge. They participate in the fixing of temporal relations within Euclidean space, enact homogenised constructions of the cultural, social and political, and thereby give rise to the “geo-body” of a nation, all the while obscuring the relations of power implicated in their production (Winichakul, 1994; Krishna, 1996; Shapiro, 1997). In Harley’s (Harley, 1990:16)
words, cartography “is never merely the drawing of maps: it is the making of worlds. Deconstructing the map is deconstructing the society that produced it”.9

The argument here is that international diplomacy and its cartography has been a conduit for the double function of representation, and is thereby a major contributor to a resolution of the tension between the objectified culture of nationalist projects and the lived experience of Bosnia in favour of the nationalists (Hayden, 1996a). International diplomacy and its cartography has, therefore, through its reliance on an apartheid logic, played an important though not single-handed role in foreclosing the possibility of non-nationalist conceptions of political community in Bosnia. For post-Dayton Bosnia this has produced a significant political paradox: the nationalists who have been accommodated, legitimised and sustained by the substance of international diplomacy now find themselves in conflict with representatives of the international community professing the priority of reintegration and seeking to overcome the dominant problematisation of Bosnia the international community helped bring into being.10

**Negotiating Bosnia**

The initiatives that the international community undertook in relation to Bosnia were part of a complex web of overlapping institutions with interwoven jurisdictions that require us to delve into a world of diplomatic and legal minutia. The purpose of this analysis is to explore the assumptions about identity made by the international community in its efforts to negotiate an end to the conflict. The focus is thus on the way in which “Bosnia” was mapped—both literally and metaphorically—as a particular place with specific people, so that it could be rendered as a problem requiring a particular solution. Other accounts stress the details of day-to-day diplomacy; this

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9 Despite his use of the term “deconstruction”, Harley’s professed indebtedness to Foucault and Derrida neither challenged some of his more conventional understandings of the relationship between map and reality nor developed their more radical conclusions (Belyea, 1992). Nonetheless, Harley’s general conclusion has been well demonstrated by those studies of the role mapping has played in colonialism, imperialism and government generally (Bassett, 1994; Buissenet, 1992; Edney, 1997), as well as those whose exposure of non-Euclidean cartography registers the limits to Euclidean conceptions (Mundy, 1996; Pandya, 1990; Stone, 1993).

10 The notion of paradox—recalling Ricoeur’s (Ricoeur, 1984) argument about the paradox of power in politics generally—is important here. In its dictionary definition, paradox refers to an apparently self-contradictory statement, one that is contrary to accepted opinion. In this context, paradox highlights the clash between the partitionists and reintegrationists in post-Dayton Bosnia, and the way the international community—through its statements, on the one hand, and its record of activity on the other—evinces both positions, something that is ultimately unsustainable. As a result, it is self-contradictory of the international community to hold only local politicians responsible for the politics of division. Although—as one of the anonymous reviewers suggested—“ambivalence” is a condition which marks the larger issue of the European imagination’s politics of identity, ambivalence does not capture the more determinate identity politics of the international community’s diplomacy with respect to Bosnia.
paper emphasises the role of key conceptual assumptions and mapping in each negotiation. 11

The major proposals concerning Bosnia to be considered were made in the period between the European Community’s first statements in June 1991 and the signing of the US-brokered “General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (the Dayton accords) in Paris on 14 December 1995. For the purpose of this analysis, that period can be divided into two. The first covers those proposals made during the time (June 1991–February 1994) the EC and the UN were the principal sponsors of the peace process. The second (February 1994–November 1995) includes those formulated mainly through the intervention of the US, Russia and other leading players (Gow, 1997; Owen, 1995; Szasz, 1992; Weller, 1992).

From London to Geneva, via Lisbon

The peace process began formally with a series of European Community declarations in mid-1991, but substantively when the EC Conference on the former Yugoslavia (ECCY) was established in September 1991. Chaired by Lord Carrington, the ECCY held thirteen plenary sessions in Brussels between September 1991 and August 1992. At the eighth session, a draft Convention (not discussed here) was agreed by five of the six republics of the former Yugoslavia. The ECCY also comprised a series of working groups, the most important of which held ten rounds of talks on constitutional arrangements for Bosnia in Sarajevo, London, Lisbon and Brussels. At the fifth and sixth rounds of these talks, a Statement of Principles was agreed to by all parties, but later repudiated by the Bosnian government.

The ECCY was followed by the UN–EC International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), which was established in August 1992 at the London Conference, where an important set of Principles was produced. Run by the Co-Chairmen of its Steering Committee, Cyrus Vance and David Owen, the ICFY comprised six working groups, including one dealing specifically with Bosnia. Although the ICFY remained in operation throughout the entire period under consideration, its personnel changed, with Vance being replaced by Thorvold Stoltenberg in May 1993, and Owen being replaced by Carl Bildt in June 1995. During that time, its major products were the Vance–Owen Peace Plan of January 1993, the Union of Three Republics Plan of September 1993, and the European Union Action Plan of November–December 1993.

The Statement of Principles, March 1992

Coming some weeks before widespread fighting broke out in Bosnia, the “Statement of Principles for New Constitutional Arrangements for Bosnia and Herzegov-

11 The following sections draw on Campbell (1998:ch.5), where the record of international diplomacy is explored in detail through its documentary archive. As a complementary discussion, this article (in combination with the associated web-site) highlights the role of cartography, and considers the implications of the argument for developments in post-Dayton Bosnia, especially the changes in policy dating from the second half of 1997.
ina” was the first proposal to deal exclusively with the republic. Developed under the auspices of the ECCY Working Group on Bosnia and Herzegovina, a process chaired by the Portuguese foreign minister José Cutiliero, their key assumption and premise was that although Bosnia would formally be an independent state within its existing borders, it should be partitioned along ethnic lines (in accordance with “national principles”) into three nations. Once again conflating “ethnic” and “nation”, this agreement maintained that sovereignty was to reside “in the citizens of the Muslim, Serb and Croat nations and other nations and nationalities” (PI, 1992b).

The constituent units proposed at Lisbon for Bosnia’s “nations” were designated as “cantons”. The concept of the “canton” had considerable significance for identity politics in both South Africa and Bosnia. During the hey-day of the bantustan policy in the 1960s and 1970s, the South African regime glorified its strategy of separate development by making it appear consistent with African decolonisation with the idea that the homelands were part of a process of “cantonisation” designed to secure self-determination. The ANC and others decried this as an attempt to “balkanise” African nationalism (Nixon, 1994:241). The idea resurfaced in the wake of the 1994 elections in South Africa when the Afrikaaner Freedom Front, seeking the basis for a white homeland, dispatched fact-finding missions to Belgium and Switzerland in support of their call for a system of cantons (Norval, 1996:286; Campbell, 1999:Section 2(vi)). Indeed, the Swiss model of consociational democracy had been much touted during the Conference for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) in the first half of 1992 (Kempton, 1994). During the Lisbon talks of February 1992, “canton” was the new catchword, and “every Serb and Croat politician in Bosnia seemed to have a copy of the Swiss constitution in his office” (Silber and Little, 1996:241).

As Nixon (1994:241) observes, “not for the first time were territorial plunder and ethnic ‘purification’ graced with a Swiss name”.

The proposed partition of Bosnia into ethnic–national cantons meant that the first peace proposal for Bosnia embodied, prior to the outbreak of open and widespread conflict in Bosnia, the very nexus between identity and territory upon which the major protagonists in the later conflict relied. The nationalist imaginary was best summarised by the deputy commander of the Bosnia Serb forces, General Milan Gvero, who declared (in terms virtually identical to Mearsheimer’s) that “everybody has to live on his own territory, Muslims on Muslim territory, Serbs on Serbian . . . This [Serb areas in Bosnia] is pure Serbian territory, and there is no power on earth that can make us surrender it” (New York Times, 1993). The connection between the Yugoslav and the South African situation was later made explicit by an international negotiator, who remarked that the option of a “loose federal state of three primarily ethnically determined ‘constituent units’, consisting of areas that would not be geographically contiguous”, meant that “without significant ethnic cleansing it will be impossible to draw boundaries that will give any coherence to three primarily ethnically based regions. (They will look like some of the Bantustans)” (PI, 1992a). As Pajić (1995:156–57) concluded, the nationalist imaginary at work in the Lisbon agreement meant that “while apartheid, which is based on the total segregation of ethnic groups, is falling apart in South Africa, it is being reborn in southern Europe”.

Which is not to claim that a replica model of South African apartheid was being
proposed for Bosnia. Instead, it is to argue that the nationalist imaginary—in which everyone of a particular type should live together in a specific space, such that these spaces are as homogeneous in character as possible—that was evident in the proposals for Bosnia followed a logic akin to apartheid’s bantustan policy. This nationalist imaginary depends upon two prior assumptions. The first is that national communities comprise people who are subjects with autonomous, intractable, and observable “ethnic” identities. The second is that those identities can be statistically represented in census data, then mapped ethnographically, so that the boundaries of community can be drawn with some precision. With regard to Bosnia, statistics commonly render the identities of Bosnia as being “ethnic” in particular proportions: “44% Muslim, 31% Serb, 17% Croats, 6% Yugoslav”, with a small remainder. (Indeed, few if any of the major academic accounts of Bosnia fail to mention this information—see Campbell, 1998a). Together these assumptions create the probability of apartheid politics and remove from all consideration those aspects of individual and communal identity which are fluid and hybrid.

To cite Yugoslav census statistics might seem to involve no more than drawing attention to an objective accounting of the population. But as Foucault (1978:25) has reminded us, to conceive of society as “a population” is to construct the social in a particular manner that is not naturally given. The statistical technology of the census then plays a crucial role in materialising society as a population bearing certain characteristics. As a technology of power/knowledge, “counting practices carve up the population in a myriad of ways, sorting and dividing people, things, or behaviours into groups, leaving in their wake a host of categories and classifications . . . more than an administrative technique for the extraction and distribution of resources, statistics have become tools in the crafting of modern subjectivity and social reality” (Urla, 1993:820). As a means of bringing national subjectivities into being, few genres have greater impact than the census which, through its mutually exclusive yet shifting national categorisations, “fill[s] in politically the formal topography of the map” (Anderson, 1991:174).

Moreover, the constructed character of the Yugoslav census is revealed by considering the emergence of “Muslim” as a national category. Although contemporary discourse has made “Muslim” synonymous with “Bosnian”, the relationship between the religious and the national is infinitely more complex. Prior to the 1961 census, when “Muslim” was given quasi-national status with the addition of the category “Muslim (ethnic membership)”, Muslims were considered to be nationally “undetermined” or else subsumed under the heading of “Yugoslav undetermined”. By 1965 the League of Communists in Bosnia-Herzegovina granted Muslims the right to national self-determination, after they had entered the federal constitution’s list of constituent nations two years earlier. However, it was not until 1971 that the census categorisation first established “Muslim” as a nationality on a par with Serb or Croat (Bringa, 1995:20–31; Friedman, 1996:151–56). This genealogy is obscured, however, by the constant citation and use of the 1991 census statistics. Obscured also are the highly politicised conditions in which the 1991 census was carried out in the former Yugoslavia; conditions in which the ethno-nationalisation of political dis-
course helped prefigure the outcome of apparently entrenched divisions of identity (Hayden, 1996a:789).

The effect is to establish these markers of identity as pre-given and socially salient, the community fault lines around which politics will revolve, thereby helping to naturalise a territorialised politics of ethnic/national self-determination. This process is furthered in the representational conjunction of identity and space (usually ethnicity and territory) in the “anthropogeographical discourse” of ethnographic maps (Noyes, 1994:241). Purporting to show the spatial distribution of identity groups, ethnographic maps have often served colonial practices of government through their reduction of dynamic social situations to conceptions of homogenous territory. Such maps feed the limitations of the census categories into the constraints of Euclidean cartography, thereby compounding the reduction of complexity and contingency. As a technology crucial for the fixing of “natives in their places”, ethnographic maps have often been deployed to justify nationalist claims (Noyes, 1994; Wilkinson, 1951).

An ethnographic map was the basis for the Lisbon Statement’s partition proposal. Although the Statement did not offer a final map agreed by all parties (though one was drafted—see Campbell, 1999:Section 2(vii)), it did establish the cartographic and statistical criteria for its division of Bosnia:

A working group will be established in order to define the territory of the constituent units based on national principles and taking into account economic, geographical and other criteria. A map based on the national absolute or relative majority in each municipality will be the basis of work in the working group, and will be subject only to amendments, justified by the above-mentioned criteria (PI, 1992b).

The significance of this provision was that a map which recorded the 1991 census figures, and represented each municipality in Bosnia through its ethnic structure (“national absolute or relative majority”), was to be the basis for the partition. The constituent units or cantons were to comprise those areas in which particular ethnic groups could be rendered as national populations and said to be in a majority. In using the 1991 census and its ethnographic map as the basis of its partition plan, the Cutiliero Statement of Principles brought into being a “mechanical division based on the crudest calculation of ethnic majorities” (Klemenčić, 1994:41). This ethnographically-derived division had many limitations, most obviously the inability of a map predicated on a singular dimension of identity, the majority status of one ethnic group, to represent the contingency and flux of identity politics in Bosnia (as discussed below).

Nonetheless, ethnographic maps of the 1991 census were the foundation for many of the international community’s efforts to resolve the Bosnian war (Campbell, 1999:Section 2 (viii)). More often than not these maps and their criteria were

12 There are a number of different maps based on the 1991 census, and their differences are deployed by different parties to different ends, as detailed in Campbell (1999:Section 2(viii)). The power of the
directly invoked. But even when they were not invoked, alternatives—such as a reliance on front-lines from the military state-of-play—indirectly recurred to ethnic principles with the implication that the acquisition of territory reflected in these maps (many of which were regularly featured in the media; see Campbell, 1999:Section 2(ix))—was driven by ethnic cleansing. Although their preponderance gives the impression of inevitability and objectivity, the particularity of ethnographic maps is evident when one considers alternative bases for territorial division, such as land ownership or functional use. 

Highlighting the importance of assumptions about identity and their statistical representation, especially in ethnographic maps, to the nationalist imaginary draws out a vital point for this argument. While there is undoubtedly a substantial difference between a military commander engaged in “ethnic cleansing”, and an international diplomat using census data to map a political solution to that “ethnic cleansing”, the difference is one of how a particular logic is operationalised. It is not a difference of competing logics, for the military commander and the international diplomat are working within the same nationalist imaginary. This is not to suggest that there is a necessary and inexorable progression from a statistical rendering and ethnographic mapping of community in ethnic terms to the politics of genocide. It is to suggest, however, that those different practices do not reflect distinct nationalist imaginaries (Hage, 1996).

Yet as detailed as the census was, and as diligent were the diplomats, no amount of cartographic effort could achieve the perfect alignment between identity and territory necessary to satisfy the nationalists. Although this logic was designed to provide the clear dividing line between the constituent units and their populations favoured by partitionists, the demographic circumstances of Bosnia undermined this intent. According to Klemencić (1994:37)—whose analysis accepts the merits of census ethnographic rationale can be indicated by Crampton (1996:354) who, although critical of the failure of the cartographic imagination with respect to Bosnia, and aware of the rarity of homogenous villages and towns, nonetheless believes that “there were identifiable regions of ethnic predominance” which could be mapped. Interestingly, his ethnographic map relying on the 1991 census comes from the US State Department. Such maps, no matter their sources, systematically underplay the contingency of identity politics, even when some statistical renderings highlight the complexity. For a good example, see Bougaridel’s table in Campbell (1999:Section 2(viii)), reproduced from Woodward (1996:759).

13 For example, to counter ethno-national claims that any one group had rights to a majority of Bosnian territory, a 1992 map produced in Sarajevo maintains that 53% of Bosnia was “state owned” with 28% “privately owned” (Campbell, 1999: Section 2(viii)). In contrast, Golubic et al., 1993 proposed a “watershed subdivision” of Bosnia as the basis for a functional separation of communities which would remain mixed. Interestingly, this proposal was consistent with the priority accorded the Swiss model, as it followed the practice of some Swiss mountain cantons. Although this proposal is rightly premised on the impossibility of ethnic cantonisation to achieve anything other than the perpetuation of violence, it still persists with the notion that some sort of division is necessary, and somewhat naively argues that “the boundaries of the Watershed Plan are inherently objective” (Golubic et al., 1993:226). In a similar vein, there was a plan devised in 1991 by unnamed spatial planners in Sarajevo for functional regions organised around major cities to divide Bosnia, while the Bosnian government—having rejected the ethnic cantonisation of the Lisbon Principles—proposed in August 1992 a scheme for non-ethnic cantons (Klemencić, 1994:35–36, 41). Maps of these three plans can be found in Campbell (1999:Section 2(iv)).
technology, including categories of idealised national populations—the divisions envisaged by the Cutiliero proposal meant nearly 18% of the Muslim population, 50% of the Serb population and 60% of the Croat population would after partition reside outside the constituent units designed for them. For this reason, partition is a form of idealism which fails to heed the realism of heterogeneity and the impossibility of division—except through the advocacy and pursuit of ethnic cleansing.

Moreover, the ethnic basis of the constituent units highlighted a profound tension within the Cutiliero Statement of Principles, a tension that was common to all subsequent peace initiatives. The Statement professed a commitment to unitary notions of the Bosnian polity through its support for the independence and integrity of Bosnia. Yet the proposal for constituent units which together would comprise that supposedly unitary polity embodied—because of the exclusive and settled identities said to give rise to the constituent units—a separatist logic hostile to any notion of overarching authority. This was evident in the idea that the constituent units could formalise connections with other republics of the former Yugoslavia. Such a proposal attempted to marry two impulses which in the end would be mutually exclusive, especially given the widely recognised desire of the Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb leaderships to leave open the possibility of territories they controlled being annexed by a Greater Croatia and Greater Serbia.

The London Principles, August 1992

From April 1992 onwards, the brutal strategies of ethnic cleansing, conducted almost exclusively by Bosnian Serb forces, inscribed a new map of division in Bosnia (Klemenčić, 1994:44). In this period the international community’s response included the deployment of UNPROFOR to Bosnia and the imposition of economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, but diplomatic negotiations, despite the formal existence of the ECCY process, were inactive. When the revelations concerning camps in which non-Serbs were interned increased the demand for a response, a new joint initiative between the EC and the UN established the formally titled International Conference on the Former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (ICFY).

With its first session held in London in August 1992, this forum involved all parties (internal and external) to the conflict, and created a series of substantive working groups similar to the ECCY process. However, unlike the Lisbon negotiations earlier in the year, it did not produce even a draft map. Instead, it voiced strong opposition to the violence, established a series of principles to serve as the basis for a negotiated settlement of the Yugoslav conflicts, and obtained agreement to a statement on Bosnia, all of which was intended to guide future cartographic considerations. Of the thirteen principles, the most important was probably number (ii) which stated there would be “non-recognition of all advantages gained by force or fait accompli or of any legal consequences thereof” (LC/C2, 1992:1533–34).

Unlike the nationalist imaginary of the Cutiliero Statement of Principles, the London Principles asserted the priority of individual rights and the importance of sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. However, they also recognised the need for the constitutional protection of ethnic and national communities, along with the
right to self-determination. The London Principles thus contained the conflicting imperatives of a unitary polity, on the one hand, and the recognition of forces which could undermine that unity, on the other. Nonetheless, with their clear condemnation of the practices of ethnic cleansing, the London Principles were not as accommodating of nationalist strategies and goals as the Lisbon agreement.

In a separate Statement on Bosnia, the London conference re-emphasised the priority of Bosnia’s sovereignty through the call for recognition and the demand for the respect of borders. Moreover, by insisting on “assurances of non-intervention by outside military forces whether formed units or irregulars”, the Statement acknowledged the external military threat Bosnia faced. Together, these provisions buttressed the unitary logic over and above the separatist possibilities of self-determination for ethnic and national groups.

Enacting the London Principles was the responsibility of the Steering Committee of the ICFY, under the Co-Chairmanship of Cyrus Vance and David Owen. Beginning in early September 1992, they embarked on a series of meetings involving the six working groups all of which were designed “to hold all the Yugoslav parties to the commitments made at the London session” (Secretary-General, 1992:1552). The Working Group on Bosnia and Herzegovina (chaired by Martti Ahtisaari) pursued negotiations on a constitutional settlement for the republic, which were to culminate in the Vance–Owen Peace Plan of January 1993 (Secretary-General, 1992:1554, 1559).

Ahtisaari reinvigorated the process that had ended after the rejection of the Cutilero Statement of Principles by distributing papers to the parties and asking for written responses to a questionnaire on how they envisaged the organisation of Bosnia. Although the London Principles were clear in the priority they accorded to the sovereignty and integrity of Bosnia, the thinking of the Working Group moved in directions that made that aim less attainable, with an emphasis on the constituent units or regions into which Bosnia could be arranged (Secretary-General, 1992:1559). Despite having made no mention of constituent units, the process of implementing the London Principles was taking the talks back to ideas first aired in Lisbon.

However, in making their political choices, the negotiators were also said to be thinking in terms of an important feature of Bosnian life, and the implications that flowed from it:

The population of Bosnia and Herzegovina is inextricably intermingled. Thus there appears to be no viable way to create three territorially distinct States based on ethnic or confessional principles. Any plan to do so would involve incorporating a very large number of members of the other ethnic/confessional groups, or consist of a number of separate enclaves of each ethnic/confessional group. Such a plan could achieve homogeneity and coherent boundaries only by a process of enforced population transfer—which has already been condemned by the International Conference, as well as by the General Assembly (resolutions 771 (1992) and 779 (1992)). Consequently, the Co-Chairmen deemed it necessary to reject any model based on three separate, ethnic/confessionally based States. Furthermore, a confederation formed of three such states would be inherently unstable,
for at least two would surely forge immediate and stronger connections with neighbouring States of the former Yugoslavia than they would with the other two units of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Secretary-General, 1992:1559).

These reflections, along with the London Principles, might have led the Co-Chairmen to endorse the concept of a centralised, unitary state. However, because this option (the Bosnian government position) was not accepted by “at least two of the principal ethnic/confessional groups”, they opposed it and endorsed the view that it “would not protect [Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb] interests in the wake of the bloody civil strife that now sunders the country” (Secretary-General, 1992:1560).

As a result, Vance and Owen argued that “the only viable and stable solution that does not acquiesce in already accomplished ethnic cleansing, and in further internationally unacceptable practices, appears to be the establishment of a decentralised State” (Secretary-General, 1992:1560). This meant a state in which the principal functions would be carried out by autonomous provinces. When it came to determining the nature of the provinces, the Co-Chairmen—though supposedly following the non-ethnic nature of the London Principles, and having rejected arguments for ethnic homogeneity—nonetheless reverted to ethnic considerations. They noted, for example, that “if the number of provinces were too few, it would be difficult to realise *ethnic homogeneity* without either violating the principle of geographic coherence or accepting the results of ethnic cleansing” (Secretary-General, 1992:1561, emphasis added). Why “realis[ing] *ethnic homogeneity*” should have been a factor at all given the previous reflections is not clear, but—contrary to more sanguine readings of the role ethnicity played in ICFY Vance–Owen process—it does suggest the nationalist imaginary was never far from the negotiators’ minds.\(^{14}\)

Furthermore, in declaring how the boundaries of the provinces would be determined, Vance and Owen return to a formulation not dissimilar to the Cutiliero principles: “the boundaries of the provinces should be drawn so as to constitute areas as geographically coherent as possible, taking into account ethnic, geographical . . . historical, communications . . . economic viability, and other relevant factors”. According to Vance and Owen, “given the demographic composition of the country, it is likely that many of the provinces (but not necessarily all) will have a considerable majority of one of the three major groups. Thus, a high percentage of each group would be living in a province in which it constitutes a numerical majority, although most of the provinces would also have significant numerical minorities” (Secretary-General, 1992:1561). Although the constitutional parameters were different, that would have been a demographic conclusion identical to the Cutiliero principles. The pursuit of homogeneity would not have eradicated the heterogeneous remainder and thus (in terms of its own logic) could not have resolved the issue.

\(^{14}\) For sanguine analyses see Gow (1997:313) and Sharp (1998:109). Both share a limited conception of “multi-ethnicity”—to be criticised in the conclusion of this paper—with the international diplomats they otherwise disagree with.
The ICFY process emerging from the London Conference bore fruit in January 1993 with the tabling of the Vance–Owen Peace Plan (VOPP) in Geneva, even though it was again only a basis for subsequent negotiations rather than an agreed plan. Embodying all the considerations discussed in the previous section, the plan itself, at least in the presentation of the constitutional framework, elided its reliance on ethnicity (PI, 1993).

The VOPP envisaged a Bosnia made up of nine provinces plus a capital district for Sarajevo (Campbell, 1999:Section 2(x)). Each community would have ended up as a majority in three provinces, with the Sarajevo district being a de facto fourth Muslim area. Klemenčić’s (Klemenčić, 1994:46–49) analysis of the demographic consequences shows that the Bihac region (with a 75% Muslim population) would have been the most homogenous, with Travnik (having a Croat plurality of 43.6%) being the least homogenous. Like the Cutiliero principles, although ethnicity was a central organising criteria, the implicit homogeneity the VOPP imagined was impossible in Bosnia in the absence of large-scale forced population transfers. The VOPP would have meant that nearly 43% of Bosnian Serbs, 44% of Muslims (30% if Sarajevo was regarded as “Muslim”) and 37% of Bosnian Croats remained outside their majority areas after the state was divided into provinces. Once again, although ethnic homogeneity was the goal, heterogeneity was unavoidable, and the idealism of partition was further exposed.

From Geneva to Paris, via Dayton, Ohio

The demise of the VOPP in May 1993 removed any drive from the ICFY process, and the US desire to be more flexible in meeting Serb demands meant that the negotiating process was given over to the combined initiative of Croatia and Serbia. The result was that the dismemberment of Bosnia became even more likely, and the position of Owen and Stoltenberg (Vance’s replacement) even more uncomfortable.

When Owen and Stoltenberg resumed their efforts in June 1993 and met the parties in Geneva, the foundations for three peace plans “basically of the same family” were laid (Owen, 1995:190). Although the not-so-covert ethnic principles of the VOPP meant division and possible de facto partition, the plans which followed—the Union of Three Republics (UTR), the EU Action Plan (EUAP), and the Contact Group proposal—resulted in proposals for de jure partition and returned the process overtly to the Cutiliero principles negotiated in Lisbon nearly eighteen months earlier. As Owen (1995:191) acknowledges, “however much the change was downplayed we were now dealing with a three-part division. I was determined that what emerged should not be called the Owen–Stoltenberg map, a label which all the parties for different reasons were only too keen to slap on it: this was neither our map nor our plan and it was important that it should be seen to have come from the Serbs and the Croats” (see Campbell, 1999:Section 2(xi)).
The Union of Three Republics Plan, September 1993

What had been agreed by the Serbs and Croats in the aftermath of the VOPP was a proposal in which any pretence of a unitary Bosnia was dispelled by reference to a “confederation” of the republics for three constituent peoples (GE, 1993). As Owen’s summary of the negotiations makes clear, “Karadzic said that Serbs could no longer accept the [VOPP] constitutional principles. Provinces were unacceptable. They were interested in a confederal solution with three republics—Republika Srpska, Herceg Bosna, and a Muslim Republic (Milosevic suggested Republika Bosna)” (CO, 1993a). A division of Bosnia into a Serb republic with 53% of the territory, a Muslim entity with at least 30% and a Croat unit with 17% was, broadly speaking, the new framework for all subsequent talks. Once again, no amount of effort in drawing boundaries could avert a situation in which large numbers of “others” found themselves living in territory controlled by a different group. Although the nationalist imaginary was now more overt than covert, the Owen–Stoltenberg negotiations nonetheless resulted a map in which 35% of Muslims and Serbs, and 53% of Croats, were “resident outside [their] titular republic” (Klemenčić, 1994:57; Campbell, 1999:Section 2(xii)). The heterogeneous remainder was—in the absence of large-scale violence—stubbornly ineradicable.

Owen and Stoltenberg were, however, supposedly operating still in terms of the London Principles, which explicitly rejected the nationalist rationale of this new position. However, this did not prevent Owen from deriding as “unrealistic” a Bosnian government position, which proposed that any federal arrangement should be based on equality for all citizens and equal rights for the constituent nations, and that the federal units “could not be divided exclusively along ethnic lines” (Owen, 1995:197, emphasis added). Although he and Stoltenberg claimed to be steering the plans so as to address Bosnian concerns, no effort was being made to fundamentally alter the parameters of possible partition, as the London Principles required. The end result was a plan for a Union of Three Republics in which Sarajevo became a UN-administered city, and a weak central administration appointed by the constituent republics could not disguise where the locus of identity and power lay.

The European Union Action Plan, November 1993

Although the Bosnian government accepted the UTR Plan in principle, they declined to sign it. Dissatisfied with the less than one-third of the territory they had been allocated, and unable to contest the ethnic rationales, they pursued an entity with 3% more territory. It was this circumstance which the European Union Action Plan (EUAP) of November 1993 addressed. It was not a significantly new cartographic or constitutional exercise (though another map was produced—see Campbell, 1999:Section 2(xiii)). Instead, it was a political push designed to get the territorial concessions the Bosnian government required before it could sign the UTR Plan (Owen, 1995:227).

The thinking behind the EUAP was prompted by Owen’s consultations and reflections in October and November 1993. They began from the premise that “Bosnia
and Herzegovina seems almost certain to split into two independent republics, and probably three”. Owen argued that given the course of events and negotiations, the Muslims—whose non-ethnic proposals were consistently rejected—were increasingly thinking in terms of an independent state of their own (CO, 1993b).

With meetings in Geneva in late November and December 1993, followed by a conference in Brussels, the EU pressed the parties for agreement, but to little avail. What the EUAP did achieve, however, was the establishment of a calculus that would shape the diplomatic negotiations for the next two years. Because of its endorsement of the UTR Plan with a slightly revised territorial split—and following a Bosnian Serb proposal which suggested these percentages—the EUAP recommended that the Muslims (with one-third of the territory) and the Croats (with 17.5%) would together have 51% of Bosnia, leaving the Bosnian Serbs with 49% (CD, 1994b). Holbrooke (1998:296) noted that whatever changes were produced in various maps, none challenged this parameter because “51–49 had taken on an almost theological force”.

The Washington Agreements, March 1994

The United States had remained largely on the negotiating sidelines during the second half of 1993, but following a policy review in early 1994 it became more engaged. The Clinton administration readied itself to increase pressure on the Bosnians to accept partition (something Owen thought they had already acceded to), an important part of which was the proposal for a Muslim–Croat federation of territories controlled by their communities in Bosnia, and a possible confederation between Bosnia and Croatia (New York Times, 1994).

What the Washington Agreements of March 1994 achieved in establishing the Federation was a return to the notion of cantonisation via a two republic solution. Although at first somewhat different from the UTR Plan’s idea of three republics, the Washington Agreements were in effect very similar. They combined the Bosnian government-controlled territory with that of the Croat community, spoke only of Bosniacs and Croats as constituent peoples, but left open the possibility for the Bosnian Serbs to constitute a second republic and join a Union at a later stage (Constitution, 1994:744).

Nothing could obscure the ethnic calculations behind the cantons (as was the case with in the VOPP) that made up the Federation. With substantial powers and their own insignia, the cantons were to be demarcated according to the same 1991 population census and ethnographic map that had been used in both the Cutiliero principles and the VOPP (Constitution, 1994: 750–51, 777, 783; Campbell, 1999:Section 2(xiv)). Even more significantly, this rationale—when combined with the elaborate mechanisms to ensure the institutions of power were balanced between the communities, including a provision that allowed the cantons of each community to establish a Council of Cantons for that community—meant that the “two republic” appearance of the Federation barely disguised its three republic logic (Constitution, 1994:752–53, 768). As a consequence, the international community should not have been surprised that this attempt to establish unity between the Bosnians and the Bosnian Croats in actuality confirmed and exacerbated the political differences between them.
The Contact Group Plan, July 1994

In the wake of the military response to the February 1994 market place bombing in Sarajevo, and the Washington Agreements, the focus of diplomatic activity moved away from the ICFY and towards a Contact Group. Comprising representatives of the US, Russia, Germany, Britain and France, it was an ad hoc diplomatic arrangement which met for the first time at the end of April 1994 (PI, 1994).

Operating initially in terms of the EUAP, the Contact Group process quickly became preoccupied with territorial issues at the expense of political structures. Although the ICFY staff involved in the process developed a constitutional structure based on a loose Union, which was derived from the UTR Plan, the position of the parties had changed in the intervening period. Much of that change was brought about by their reading of the political effects of the Washington Agreements. As the Ludlow report notes, when presented with this revised constitutional package, “the Croats made it clear that a two way arrangement between the Federation and the Serbs would be unacceptable to them. Any Union had to take into account the fact there were three constituent peoples. The Serbs were reluctant to discuss any type of Union arrangement at all. They argued that the establishment of the Bosniac–Croat Federation and the proposed confederation with Croatia ruled out any possibility of the Republika Srpska joining such a Union” (PI Contact Group Negotiations, Part 3). In other words, contrary to its expressed intent, the three republic logic of the Washington Agreements had strengthened the drive for total partition.

The doubts expressed by the Croats and the Serbs led to a situation where the Contact Group expressly decided to decouple the political and the territorial aspects of the negotiations, so as to concentrate on the latter. The consequence was that the Contact Group offered in July 1994 a map for the parties—organised around the 51/49 split of territory between two entities—“to accept or reject as the basis for further negotiations” (Owen, 1995:296; Campbell, 1999:Section 2(xv)). Despite subsequent meetings with the parties, this map was for over a year simply left on the table for acceptance. It was accompanied by the contradictory strategy of, on the one hand, a refusal to negotiate with the Bosnian Serbs until they accepted it, and, on the other hand, an absence of any commitment to force acceptance.

The General Framework Agreement, December 1995

The Dayton accords were achieved after a change in the strategic balance during the summer of 1995. The Croatian military’s capture of the Krajina areas, heavy NATO bombing of Bosnian Serb positions, and the retreat of the Bosnian Serb army brought about through the combined efforts of Bosnian and Croatian forces—with all the military activity constantly encouraged by Holbrooke and his team—helped create the conditions for a resumption of negotiations. As Holbrooke (1998:168) observed in fax to Warren Christopher, US Secretary of State, on 20 September 1995, these military activities were a form of cartographic practice:

Contrary to many press reports and other impressions, the Federation military offensive has so far helped the peace process. This basic truth is perhaps not
something we can say publicly right now . . . In fact, the map negotiation, which always seemed to me to be our most daunting challenge, is taking place right now on the battlefield, and so far, in a manner beneficial to the map. In only a few weeks, the famous 70%–30% division of the country has gone to around 50–50, obviously making our task easier.

However, these military activities were not given an unconditional green light. They were supported by the US only as long as they were following the maps of previous peace initiatives and using those maps as guides. At a White House meeting on 21 September 1995, Holbrooke admitted to Anthony Lake, the National Security Adviser, that contrary to the US government’s public calls for a halt to the Federation advance,

We asked them not to take Banja Luka, but we did not give the Croatians and the Bosnians any other “red lights”. On the contrary, our team made no effort to discourage them from taking Prijedor and Sanski Most and other terrain that is theirs on the Contact Group map. The map negotiations are taking place on the battlefield right now, and that is one of the reasons we have not delayed our territorial discussions. It would help the negotiations greatly if these towns fell (Holbrooke, 1998:172, emphasis added).

In support of this view, Owen (1995:337) argues that a close observer of the allied military intervention would have noticed that some of NATO’s decisions (for example, Serb aircraft which counterattacked Croat and Muslim forces were not shot down as required by the no-fly zone policy, nor were the airfields from which they took off attacked) indicated a decision had been taken to ensure the outcome of the fighting did not stray from the basis of the Contact Group plan, the 51/49 territorial division. This signified the increasing importance of maps of the military situation, with their indirect invocation of the nexus between ethnicity and territory, over the direct connections represented by ethnographic maps (Campbell, 1999:Section 2(ix)). This culminated in the role the Defense Mapping Agency, with its virtual reality PowerScene technology, played during the Dayton negotiations (Holbrooke, 1998:283).

However, remaining within the parameters of the Contact Group map entailed unsavoury decisions on the part of the US. As a memorandum prepared by the then US Ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright, made clear, the US would have to sanction the trading of territory and the transfer of populations, thereby effectively legitimising ethnic cleansing. This marked an important confirmation of the long term shift in American policy which helped produce an alignment with European proposals (The Guardian, 1996).

Meeting in Geneva and New York in September 1995 the foreign ministers of Bosnia, Croatia and Yugoslavia (the latter of whom was working on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs) agreed to six basic principles, the first two of which outlined the basis of the proposed resolution: that “Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue its legal existence with its present borders and continuing international recognition”; and that
it “will consist of two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as established by the Washington Agreements, and the Republika Srpska (RS)” (PI, 1995). Missing from the Geneva principles was the lack of any agreement about the nature of the central government which would provide the “connective tissue between the two entities” (Holbrooke, 1998:144) Conceding this was a major flaw, Holbrooke (1998:141) notes that “without this, the agreement could easily be construed as having partitioned Bosnia, when the exact opposite was our goal”.

These principles provided the basis for the November 1995 proximity talks held at the Wright–Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio. The General Framework Agreement (GFA) produced by these talks consists of eleven articles which endorse the contents of eleven annexes, each of which is an agreement between three parties: the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the subject with international legal personality, comprising two entities), and each of the entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska. The entities were demarcated by the Inter-Entity Boundary Line and the Zone of Separation (Szasz, 1995; Campbell, 1999:Section 2 (xxvi)).

Problematising “Bosnia”

Klemenčić (1994:71)—whose analysis concluded with the Washington Agreement maps of May 1994—argues the international community’s peace proposals can be considered as comprising two forms. The first includes the “division maps” in which the international boundaries and integrity of Bosnia was maintained, but the country was internally reorganised so as to accommodate ethnic demands, such as in the VOPP. The second are the “partition maps” which result more or less in the dissolution of Bosnia, claims to the contrary notwithstanding, of which the UTR plan is the best example.

However, Klemenčić’s analysis misses an important dimension which calls into question his categorisation and suggests the partitionist logic is more common. By focusing solely on the territorial mapping of the proposals he fails to pay sufficient attention to the divisive nature of the constitutional proposals (or political map) which accompany them. In this sense, given that each of the initiatives involved devolutions of political power to ethnic majorities, and were accompanied by spatial arrangements to match, they all embodied to some extent the logic of partition. It was strongest in the Cutiliero principles, the UTR Plan, EUAP and the Contact Group proposals. Absent from the London Principles—as well as the many UN Security Council resolutions which began by “reaffirming the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina”—the logic of partition was present in the VOPP because of the tension between its unitary claims and its ethnic provincial structure.

In this sense, the GFA produced at Dayton is the logical product of a process which since the Cutiliero Statement of Principles did not question its basic anthropological or political assumptions. Although the map which accompanied the GFA differed in terms of the actual territories assigned to the entities either side of the
Inter-Entity Boundary Line, its adherence to the 51/49 parameter demonstrates its indebtedness to the earlier talks. Furthermore, the constitutional arrangements are nearly identical to those proposed before. Most importantly, although since the UTR Plan of 1993 the acceptance of an autonomous Bosnian Serb unit has been on the cards, the GFA is the first agreement to officially name and legitimise Republika Srpska.

Herein lies the single greatest paradox of the GFA, a paradox that has bedevilled the Bosnian peace process. On the one hand, the GFA—according to the preamble of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina—remains “committed to the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina in accordance with international law” (GFA, 1995:118). On the other hand, Bosnia now comprises two distinct entities each of which has its own ethnically-organised political structures, controls citizenship, and can “establish special parallel relationships with neighbouring states”, although this is supposed to be “consistent with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina” (GFA, 1995:118, 120; Gow, 1997:289–92). Even more significantly, the standard international instrument of sovereignty—control over the legitimate use of force—rests not with Bosnia and Herzegovina but with the entities. Bosnia and Herzegovina has no integrated army or police force to secure its borders and territory. Indeed, the arrangements for the three-member shared presidency (one from each constituent nation) set out in Article 5 (v) of the constitution involve a Standing Committee on Military Matters which co-ordinates rather than commands military forces. It is comprised of a Serb member who is commander-in-chief of the Republika Srpska army, a Croat member who is commander-in-chief of the Croat Defence Council, and a Bosniac member who is commander-in-chief of the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The logic of partition was thus never far removed from the international community’s proposals. Although partitionists like Mearsheimer dispensed with the international community’s fig leaf of sovereignty residing in a republic comprised of entities, and although they cast their arguments as a critique of Dayton and its supposed goal of a unitary state characterised by multi-ethnicity, the practical effect of Dayton has not been as antithetical to partition as claimed by those seeking to advocate partition anew.

The considerable affinities between partitionists’ proposals and the product of five years of international diplomacy have been made possible by a shared problematisation of Bosnia. For Bosnia to be thought of as a problem requiring a solution, it has to be problematised in a particular way. Different problematisations mandate different political options. Rendered as a “civil war”, Bosnia invites different strategies than those which might be involved if it were to be cast as “international aggression”. What the above argument demonstrates is that both the partitionists and the international community have problematised Bosnia in terms of a nationalist imaginary—as a place where political identity is fixed in terms of ethnic exclusivity and requires territorial space to match. In other words, both the partitionists and the international community invoke and rely upon a particular political anthropology of Bosnia to secure the “realistic” nature of their proposals.

This is most evident in the partitionist argument of Mearsheimer and others. Bos-
nia is a seamless, ethnically-ordered world of Croats, Muslims and Serbs, in which no other conceptions of identity have political import, and where group relations cannot be other than mutually exclusive and conflictual. Partition is thus the inevitable result. But if Bosnia is something other than a seamless, ethnically-ordered world of Croats, Muslims and Serbs, partition will be no more than one political option amongst others.

Of course, the invocation of ethnicity as a determinant of the Bosnian war is so common it seems quite natural. Yet it only appears natural because few have questioned what it involves. Indeed, while the International Relations’ literature on “ethnic conflict” flourishes, it contains little if any reflection on the category (“ethnicity”) without which it would not be possible. It thus comes as little surprise to observe that a partitionist like Mearsheimer spends no time at all examining the meaning and salience of ethnicity for the argument. To do that work we need to consider an argument which links itself explicitly with Mearsheimer’s partitionism, but provides a fuller theorisation of some of the assumptions about identity politics on which they depend. It is an argument that indicates some of the larger issues at stake in reviewing the political anthropology of international diplomacy with respect to Bosnia.

**Hard Categories, Small Hutus and Ethnic Bosnia**

According to Chaim Kaufmann (1996:138), “ethnic conflicts” like Bosnia are marked by “almost completely rigid” identifications. This notion of rigidity is built into the very definition of ethnicity employed by Kaufmann, which states that “an ethnic group (or nation) is commonly defined as a body of individuals who purportedly share cultural or racial characteristics, especially common ancestry or territorial origins, which distinguish them from members of other groups”. As a result, it is said that “opposing communities in ethnic civil conflicts hold irreconcilable visions of the identity, borders and citizenship of the state” (Kaufmann, 1996:138n). Although Kaufmann (1996:140n) maintains he does “not take a position on the initial sources of ethnic identities”, this caveat is contradicted by the proposition to which it is a footnote: “ethnic identities are fixed by birth”. Indeed, he maintains that ethnicity is the “hardest” of identity categories because it depends on “language, culture, and religion, which are hard to change, as well as parentage, which no one can change”. Although hard to begin with, Kaufmann (1996:141) argues ethnicity hardens further during violent conflict.

Kaufmann’s argument manifests the way in which “ethnicity” is a code for race (Manzo, 1996). Identifying this most fixed of categories, Kaufmann (1996:145) argues, can be achieved via “outward appearance, public or private records, and local social knowledge”. For example, with respect to public records, Kaufmann maintains that “while it might not have been possible to predict the Yugoslav civil war thirty years in advance, one could have identified the members of each of the warring groups from the 1961 census, which identified the nationality of all but 1.8% of the population”. This remark, with its social scientific assumptions about the transparent nature of data, reveals some of the problems evident in this argument. It is oblivious not only to the general points about the politics of statistics, but also the specific
points about the genealogy of the Yugoslav census and the category of “Muslim”, as discussed above.

But the problems with that assertion pale by comparison with the claim that physical characteristics are meaningful signposts for ethnicity. No examples are provided with respect to the former Yugoslavia, so turning his attention elsewhere Kaufmann (1996:146n) declares that “in unprepared encounters ethnicity can often be gauged by outward appearance: Tutsis are generally tall and thin, while Hutus are relatively short and stocky; Russians are generally fairer than Kazakhs”. In case the reader might imagine this was an ironic observation, Kaufmann cites in support of this a US Army country study, which is paraphrased as follows: “Despite claims that the Hutu–Tutsi ethnic division was invented by the Belgians, 1969 census data showed significant physical differences: Tutsi males averaged 5 feet 9 inches and 126 pounds, Hutus 5 feet 5 inches and 131 pounds”. Leaving aside the dubious claim that an average of four inches and five pounds constitutes a significant difference, and deferring the disputable suggestion that even if there was a physical difference it could harbour any political significance, this remark exhibits—despite the references to ethnic identity—a form of racism long since discredited in anthropology and sociology (AAPA, 1996).

The crude essentialism and primitive rigidity of Kaufmann’s conception of ethnicity sets in train a logic which leads inexorably towards partition as the best and only solution to so-called ethnic conflict. In this context, Kaufmann (1996:139) asserts that “solutions that aim at restoring multi-ethnic civil politics and at avoiding population transfers” simply cannot work. Any proposal that involves the interaction of communities is bound to fail, leaving only the total victory of one side, temporary suppression by external intervention, or partition stand as possible solutions. Of these, partition is what Kaufmann favours, because he argues (Kaufmann, 1996:149) that the safest way to overcome a security dilemma is “a well-defined demographic front that separates nearly homogenous regions”. Given this, “the international community must abandon attempts to restore war-torn multi-ethnic states. Instead, it must facilitate and protect population movements to create true national homelands” (Kaufmann, 1996:137).

But the crude essentialism and primitive rigidity of Kaufmann’s conception of ethnicity which underpins his apartheid politics exhibits a studied ignorance of the subtleties of the anthropological literature on ethnicity, which emphasises the contingent and constructed nature of ethnic identity (Banks, 1996; Comaroff, 1987, 1991; Denich, 1993; Danforth, 1995: Verdery, 1994), and the way in which uncertainty about its reality contributes to “ethnic violence” (Appadurai, 1998). As a result, “ethnicity” is better understood as a component of the representational politics of identity—particularly the identity of “others”—and attempts to naturalise ethnicity are best regarded as efforts to remove the question of identity/difference and its materialisation from the realm of politics. Given the obvious importance of issues of identity to conflicts such as that in Bosnia, this interpretative move is deeply flawed.

It is, however, a move that the international community’s efforts have shared with the partitionist argument, albeit with a little more ambivalence. For the international community, Bosnia is more often than not a seamless, ethnically-ordered world.
Sometimes arguments that could have been directly lifted from Kaufmann have been evident in the negotiators’ thinking. For example, when pondering whether or not one could regard Bosnian president Izetbegović as a “fundamentalist”, Lord Owen (1995:39) resorted to the idea that ethnicity can be physically observed: “There were no outward and visible signs that he was a Muslim. He, his son and his daughter dressed and acted as Europeans”.

Significantly, the political anthropology which informed international diplomacy was derived from an adherence to the identity assumptions of two of the parties to the conflict. As the report on the ICFY process stated:

> It is common ground among the parties that Bosnia and Herzegovina is populated by three major “constituent peoples” or ethnic/confessional groups, namely the Muslims, the Serbs and the Croats, and also by a category of “others”. Two of the parties contend that in designing a government for the country a predominant role must be given to these “constituent peoples”. The other party considers that there should be no such overt recognition, although it admits that the political processes of the country have been and are likely to continue to be characterised by religio/ethnic factors (Secretary-General, 1992:1562).

Of course, the notion of structuring a polity in terms of three “constituent peoples” was at the heart of Tito’s Yugoslavia. But not all international parties to the conflict endorsed wholeheartedly this anthropology. According to a February 1994 memorandum from Lord Owen’s private secretary, one of the ICFY staff was “very concerned about the lack of objectivity and understanding of the background and history on the part of the Americans. He spent a long time trying to convince Oxman [an American negotiator] that there were three peoples in Bosnia, not just the Muslims and a collection of ‘minorities’. US still sees its role as protector of the Muslims, and that the others must just follow along. Steiner is worried that the European voice will just not be heard” (CD, 1994a).

Although European and American renderings of Bosnia differed in their details, they often shared an alliance with the statistical representation of the country’s population discussed at the outset. This was evident also in the Mearsheimer argument, which would have produced a map whereby the Muslims controlled some 35% of Bosnia’s former territory, the Serbs 45% and the Croats 20%. A form of justice would thus have been achieved because “these percentages roughly reflect the amount of territory each group controlled in pre-war Bosnia” (Mearsheimer and Pape, 1993).

A similar rationale was offered by Owen to counter that charge that the VOPP rewarded “Serbian aggression”. In a *Foreign Affairs* interview, Owen denied this could be the case by arguing:

> The rural Bosnian Serbs sat on over 60% of the country before the war, and we are offering them three provinces covering 43%. I’m also careful not use the simplistic calculation “aggression” because this is both a civil war and a war of aggression. The Bosnian Serbs are fighting for territory in which they have lived
for centuries. They have of course been aided and abetted by Serbs outside Bosnia–Herzegovina. And they have been substantially equipped militarily by Serbs outside Bosnia–Herzegovina. It is a very complex war in its origins (Owen, 1995a).

Highlighting ethnic patterns of land ownership said to have preceded the war—and attaching political importance to them—was a common feature of Bosnian Serb arguments. Jovan Zametica employed similar points in an effort to diminish the charge that, in their opposition to the Vance–Owen plan, they were “flouting” the international community: “Please understand those whom you wish to destroy: Bosnian Serbs do not imagine they are conquering anything. Most of the land in Bosnia is theirs, legally, farm by farm. They have tried to secure its possession—within some form of Serbian state, statelet or set of cantons . . . Before the war, 64 per cent of land was registered to Serbs as most lived in rural areas” (Zametica, 1993). Not surprisingly given his later role as Radovan Karadžić’s spokesperson, Zametica’s argument and figures were deployed by Karadžić in his opposition to various peace initiatives (OMRI Daily Digest, 1995). This was but another instance of the evident affinities between the partitionist argument, the international diplomats, and the nationalist imaginary.

The nexus between territory and identity manifest in these claims helped resolve any ambivalence about the ethnicisation of Bosnia. This was important, because a certain ambivalence about the priority accorded a political anthropology of ethnicity for Bosnia could be discerned from time to time. Paradoxically, given the constitutional centrality of “three major ‘ethnic’ (national/religious) groups”, some ICFY proposals said there was to be “no official ethnic identification of citizens (e.g., on identity cards)”. Despite the ethnic considerations at play in the construction of the VOPP provinces, the proposed constitutional structure cautioned that “none of the provinces [are] to have a name that specifically identifies it with one of the major ethnic groups”. And while there was to be “ethnic balancing and integration of the military forces”, there was to be “non-discriminatory composition of the police” (Secretary-General, 1992:1585, 1591).

Furthermore, some of Owen’s public pronouncements often contradicted much (if not all) of the essentialist identity assumptions prevalent in both ICFY thinking and some of his other statements. When asked by Foreign Affairs whether, “given the hatred and the bloodshed of the past two years and the historic ethnic enmities, is it realistic to hope these groups will lie down together and live in peace”, Owen (1995a) replied:

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15 The meaning, let alone political significance, of “legal possession”, “ownership”, or “registration” in pre-war Bosnia is a complex affair. As a republic within a socialist state that possessed a unique system of social ownership, rendering these issues in terms common to capitalist property relations is a questionable move, albeit with clear political consequences. For a discussion of the Yugoslav situation see Horvat (1976). For a Bosnian map on land ownership which counters Zametica’s claims see Campbell (1999:Section 2(viii)).
I think it’s realistic because these people are of the same ethnic stock. I believe some political leaders in the Balkans are not authentically speaking for all their people. There are still very strong elements of moderation within Bosnia–Herzegovina. Many people there still see themselves as European and even now don’t think of themselves as Muslim, Croat or Serb, some deliberately and proudly call themselves just Bosnians. The sentiment is reflected in the degree of intermarriage. It’s reflected in the fact that, even now, you can go to Sarajevo under bombardment and see Muslims, Serbs and Croats living together in the same streets and apartments. Throughout Yugoslavia people are still all mixed in together and, in many cases, living peaceably.

Owen’s statement recalls the ICFY report which observed that the Bosnian population was “inextricably intermingled” such that partition was impossible. We can thus observe here a contradiction in Owen’s thought similar to Kaufmann’s (Kaufmann, 1996a:66n) incoherent view that Bosnia was an “ethnic” conflict even though the groups were “ethnically indistinguishable”. Given that the ethnic problematisation of Bosnia triumphed despite such reflections, this suggests that once “ethnics” are privileged in representations of conflict, division becomes likely policy.

The politics of the enclave, and other possibilities

The political effects of the political anthropology which informed the international community’s diplomacy with respect to Bosnia lead us to the conclusion that Dayton’s adherence to “multi-ethnicity” is anything but antithetical to ethnic divisions. This partitionist logic in the Dayton agreement means, therefore, that division is not one of two equal choices, but a more probable outcome than unity. In conjunction with Vance and Owen’s claim that their ethnic provincialisation of Bosnia was designed to defend a multiethnic society, or the public presentation of the Dayton agreement as being an instrument for the restoration of a multiethnic Bosnia, it indicates international diplomats have been working with a notion of multi-ethnicity rather different from one which would contest de facto or de jure division along ethnic lines. Seemingly the sheer presence of more than one ethnic group within the external borders of the state, even if those groups were in their own spaces, is sufficient for the polity to qualify as multiethnic.

In so far as we can pretend that Dayton and the other agreements intended a multiethnic Bosnia, it is an “enclave multi-ethnicity” they had in mind, where the aggregation of predominately homogenous entities within a thin veneer of external unity substitutes for a more thorough complexity—something akin to the colonial practices associated with the abandoned Bantustans of South Africa. This means that some conceptions of multi-ethnicity are consistent with partition. For it to be otherwise, we have to recognise that multi-ethnicity entails more than the mathematical antithesis of monoculturalism and homogeneity. As William Connolly has argued (Connolly, 1996:61, using a broader category to contest the enclave formation), “multiculturalism . . . does not merely pose a challenge to national models of state
politics and arboREAL models of pluralism. It also embodies within itself a quarrel between the national protection of diverse cultural minorities on the same territory and the pluralization of multiple possibilities of being within and across states”.

With respect to Bosnia, the international community resolved that tension in favour of the former conception, and to the detriment of the latter. As a result, Dayton is one element amongst many consistent with the drive to “depluralize the nation” and counter to efforts which “denationalize pluralism” (Connolly, 1996:56).

The central point of this argument is that things could have been different if the political anthropology of Bosnia—in which the conceptual landscape has been populated only by fixed ethnicity, three constituent peoples, and others—had been differently problematised. The categories of identity politics were often a topic for diplomatic discussion, but they might have been limited by the power of the nationalist imaginary. Nonetheless, these moments of diplomatic identity discussion include the November 1992 report by the ICFY Co-Chairmen which made clear the assumptions they were working with (and how they had been contested in part by the Bosnian government), and the memorandum from Lord Owen’s staff during the negotiations for the Washington Agreements which made obvious the different approach of the Americans to the make-up of Bosnia. Moreover, the documents creating the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, along with the Bosnian constitution in the GFA, spoke of “Bosniacs” rather than “Muslims”, thereby indicating change was clearly possible (Bringa, 1995:32–36). At those junctures, had the question of identity been thought in terms of a necessary but political production which creates the

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16 This points to an important point which unfortunately cannot be explored in the space available—the way in which the political anthropology of international diplomacy, and the political anthropology of partitionist arguments, both draws upon and reiterates aspects of a larger Euro-American political discourse. Evident in the way “ethnic” and “national” are conflated as a code for race, this discourse manifests itself, for example, in the contentious debates about the impact of immigration on the identity of Britain, France, Germany and the United States. In these debates, differences (“cultural”, “ethnic” and “racial”) are said to be necessarily divisive such that separation comes to be viewed as a progressive policy. This nationalist imaginary, which also drives Dayton, thereby embodies a “meta-racism” which is central to Euro–American conceptions of community and not, as is commonly suggested, a condition found only amongst the “primitives” of the Balkans (Balibar and Wallerstein, 1991; Duffield, 1996; Salecl, 1994; Todorova, 1997).

17 According to Woodward (1996:761), there is also the fact that scholars “have not provided the diplomats and peacebuilders with advice on putting their constructivist approach to identity into practice.” Woodward’s point—which differs from the argument in this paper insofar as I use notions of performativity rather than construction (Campbell, 1998b)—suggests the onus lies on scholars to provide rather than diplomats to seek. That there surely has been sufficient knowledge in anthropological and political fields to contest from the beginning the ethnicisation of Bosnia suggests the latter may be the greater problem. Moreover, diplomats could be regarded as inclined to act even when they know they are in ignorance. After all, before he was drafted in to delineate the partition of India, Cyril Radcliffe “knew nothing about India other than the five perspiring weeks he spent there, trying with maps and pens to fulfil his impossible duty of devising a judicious cartography” (Khilnani, 1997:201). In a similar vein, Holbrooke (1998:303) recounts this small episode from the Dayton negotiations: “Thinking of Harold Nicholson’s negotiators at Versailles, who drew lines on maps with almost no understanding of what they were doing, I drew a line on the map that ran down the middle of the Sava River, directly on the international border, and then curved around the town’s [Orasje] boundaries.”
grounds that are supposedly fixed and natural, then an appreciation of the political effects of particular representations could have been part of the process. The opening was there, but both the imagination and the commitment were sorely lacking. The international community’s representation of (and resultant inaction with respect to) the on-going crisis in Kosovo indicates the persistence of this problem.

Not that the deployment of different categories or names would have been sufficient. What was required, in Connolly’s terms, was to initiate strategies which would have resulted in the pluralization of possibilities of being on the same territory. In the first instance, an attentiveness to and support for the local forces that contested the nationalist imaginary would have been necessary (Bougarel, 1996; Campbell, 1998:ch.7). Consistent with this, in the realm of international diplomacy, would have been the implementation of one of the agreed resolutions. If the mandate of the London Principles had been scrupulously followed, non-ethnic and non-national options could have been formulated. While the political difficulties of implementing such options cannot be underestimated (though in contrast to options like forced population transfers, neither should they be overestimated), it is often forgotten that all parties to the conflict agreed to those principles. Although the fact that they followed the international community’s first encouragement in Lisbon of ethnic division no doubt weakened them, holding the parties to their August 1992 commitments was far from impossible.18

Equally, all this leads to the conclusion that the partitionist arguments about what is and is not possible are fundamentally flawed. Because they depend upon a contestable political anthropology, which resulted in the absence of a comprehensive and sustained effort by the international community to pursue non-ethnic and non-national options, it is impossible to credibly conclude that such initiatives could not in principle succeed. While the complete details of the partitionist position were rejected during the ICFY process, and Dayton’s multiethnic and unitary facade appears to contradict them, the practical effects of the international community pursuing a logic akin to that of Mearsheimer and other partitionists has meant that partition is far from being a distant and future possibility. It is against this outcome of its own making that the international community’s representatives in Bosnia are currently struggling.

These arguments have offered testimony to diplomacy’s failings rather than partitionists’ virtue. Indeed, the conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that proposals for the ethnicisation of Bosnia and its partition constitute a dangerous idealism rather than a sober realism. Because each of the proposals for division acknowledged that they could not realise the homogeneity they sought (for there was always going to be a substantial percentage of each group outside of its area, unless widespread ethnic cleansing was prescribed), they endangered the heterogeneous remainder they could never expunge. In effect, the proposals for division created new “ethnic minorities” at the same time as they legitimised strategies for their eradication. In seeking

18 Although necessarily counterfactual, this point is supported by Vuillamy’s (Vuillamy, 1998:79–81) discussion of the military options that were available but were either not followed or actively avoided.
to ameliorate violence, proposals for partition have thus ended up encouraging it. Combined with the authoritarian impulse behind the proposals—population transfer would be forced, without reference to what those affected wanted—these arguments demonstrate the urgent need for modes of thought and strategies for action which do not seek a violent relationship to difference. As a result, they call into question Mearsheimer’s faith that it is because of Bosnia one should be a realist (Lapid and Kratochwil, 1996:125n). They suggest instead that, for Bosnia’s sake, it is to be regretted that the diplomats were not attuned to the way the international community’s problematisation of Bosnia as an intractable ethnic problem, based on the unquestioned link between identity and territory, required partition and has enabled the divisions and violence they are still working to counter. The “inevitability” of partition stems, therefore, from the reiteration of a particular and problematic political anthropology rather than any essential quality of identity politics and “ethnic” conflict in the Balkans.

Possibilities beyond the State

This critique of partitionist logic might be read as endorsing the traditional goals of territorial integrity and political sovereignty as the best option for Bosnia. Indeed, if the options are framed solely within a discourse that has ethno-nationalist partition and the state-centric grammar of sovereignty as its extremes then that would be a plausible and justifiable conclusion. But if our political imagination spans a broader horizon then such a conclusion would be both hasty and limited.

Current global political practices involve the re-articulation of sovereignty, making a return to traditional conceptions of state sovereignty at least as nostalgic for Bosnia as they are for all other members of international society. But there are also specific features of Bosnia’s post-Dayton environment that make such a return highly unlikely. Although the idea of an international protectorate over Bosnia has been discursively dismissed, the Dayton agreement provided the internal basis for such an infrastructure even if Bosnia’s international status meant it did not fit the legal definition (Grant, 1997:331; Pajić, 1998:126). With NATO being the international community’s military representative, the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia was established to govern civilian projects, and a Peace Implementation Council (PIC) of supervising states was created to review compliance with the Dayton agreement.19 Similarly, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia includes three foreign nationals appointed by the European Court of Human Rights; the IMF named a New Zealander as governor of the Central Bank; the Human Rights Ombudsman is an OSCE-appointee; and the Human Rights Chamber will have a majority of non-Bosni-ans named by the Council of Europe. All of which operate in a security environment dominated by NATO’s Stabilisation Force and the UN’s International Police Task

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19 Technically this infrastructure was foreseen rather than created by the Dayton agreements, and required subsequent decisions by various international organisations, especially the UN Security Council and NATO (Szasz, 1995:78).
Force. As Pajic (1998a) has rather ruefully noted, the structure of international governance that many progressive people called for prior to the outbreak of the war is now in place, though its task is to address the consequences of the violence rather than prevent them. The shuffling of all responsibility for the future of Bosnia to actors other than the international community thus seriously mis-recognises the consequences of the complex transnational infrastructure that is post-Dayton Bosnia.

This re-articulation of sovereignty involves spatial dimensions other than the state or the international. One initiative being given greater prominence is the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee’s (UNHCR) “Open Cities” strategy, whereby particular towns and villages are granted increased economic assistance if they both welcome and encourage the return of refugees regardless of ethnicity. If implemented, this would both require and ensure communities where freedom of movement and settlement challenged fixed categories of identity. To date, this strategy has not realised its potential, although local displaced persons groups have overcome a lack of international assistance to make “minority returns”—the return of refugees to areas controlled by different ethnic groups, a development crucial to reintegration—a reality (Sharp, 1998:27; ICG, 1997, 1998, c, d, e, f). Increasing numbers of refugees are overcoming the political hostility of “their” group leaderships to undertake minority returns.

For one town in particular, this strategy could be crucial. Brčko, in the north-east corner of Bosnia, remains under the direct control of an international mandate and US supervisor since the decision over its future—whether it is to come under the jurisdiction of one entity or the other—was postponed in March 1998 for another year. Bosnian Serbs regard it as strategically vital for their entity, and Bosnians/Muslims regard it has historically significant given its infamy as the site of some the worst ethnic cleansing, but returning it to either the control of Republika Srpska or the Federation would further legitimise the partition of the entities. Given this, the International Crisis Group (ICG, 1998a) has proposed that the unified Brčko municipality be granted special status. Sovereignty would be formally shared between the entities, a new municipal council would administer the zone, and limited autonomy—which could not be territorially-based—would be granted to individual communities to secure cultural rights. If developed, this option would involve the more complex appreciation of communal space and territoriality recommended by Gottlieb (1993).

Creative re-articulations of sovereignty between cities, the state and the international of this kind are potentially progressive developments, although the fate of EU-administered Mostar (where despite some years of transnational authority ethnic divisions are as vicious as ever) is a salutary reminder that novel administrative or spatial arrangements themselves do not make for inclusive polities open to difference. Indeed, specific articulations of space and sovereignty are at the same time particular materialisations of power. As Foucault (1980:68) has observed, “territory is no doubt a geographical notion, but it’s first of all a juridico-political one: the area controlled by a certain kind of power”. Contesting the identity politics of partition, therefore, involves more than the redrawing of geopolitical boundaries; it has to involve the
problematisation of identity and the power relations which effected the division in the first place.

To that end, changes in key personnel during 1997 (including a new US Secretary of State, a new British Foreign Secretary, and new officials in key NATO and OHR posts), and changes in policy implementation (in particular, the May and December 1997 declarations of the PIC instructing the High Representative to impose decisions pursuant to the Dayton agreement to overcome local resistance), have been significant. The sum of these developments is that the international community has been increasingly assertive in fostering the long-proclaimed goal of the reintegration of Bosnia’s communities, abandoning its previously “deferential approach to Bosnia’s nationalist leaders and . . . instead, taking them on” (ICG, 1998c:3; Cohen, 1998). Utilising this power, the High Representative, Carlos Westendorp, has intervened to force agreement on the symbolic artefacts of statehood. Directives to finalise a new national crest, flag, anthem, currency, passport design and vehicle license plates free from ethnic symbols appear to indicate that relations of power antithetical to partition now predominate (Campbell, 1999:Section 2 (xviii)). However, these representations of integration highlight the ambiguities of Dayton for they have to coexist with the more nationalistic symbols of Bosnia’s entities.

Furthermore, the High Representative’s initiatives recall one of the paradoxes of the ICFY diplomatic process. As noted above, although that process was organised in terms of a specific political anthropology of ethnic identity, it too proposed that overt means of ethnic identification (such as marked identity cards) that were in tensions with representations of a united state were not to be permitted. This suggests that the effort to remove ethnic significations from Bosnia might either mask or deflect attention from the persistence of other more important ethnically-organised practices.

This can be demonstrated by the continuing salience of ethnic identity politics in the internationally-organised electoral procedures of post-war Bosnia, as some of the specific electoral procedures (such as the P2 voter forms with their flexible options about one’s place of registration) continue to permit abuse by nationalists (Blessington, 1998:593; Campbell, 1998:ch.7). Bosnia’s electoral system depends upon sanctions and rewards ethnic division, even though some local politicians are adopting less nationalist positions (Bennett, 1998; Curak, 1998). In conjunction with the ethnicised political structures of post-Dayton Bosnia, and the diplomatic record of reliance on and appeasement of nationalist partners, it should not therefore come as a shock to find political forces in Bosnia promoting their interests in terms of ethno-national division. As much as the international community’s representatives wish to present themselves as the guardians of Dayton’s (limited) multiethnic spirit—and in facing down the propaganda of Pale TV and the efforts of Federation authorities to perpetuate unjust laws on abandoned property and establish segregated educational curricula (ICG, 1998), as well as enabling some minority refugee returns, they perhaps warrant that label—their greater task is to overcome or undo those ethnically-organised practices they have inherited and reinforced. Particular relations of power produce specific subjects and territorialise the space of Bosnia. Unless
those relations of power which ethnicise Bosnia are diminished, no amount of spatial reconfiguration will overcome partition.

It is not, however, only the representatives of the international community who face this challenge. The power of the political anthropology of ethnicity is a problem even for those critical of the international community’s appeasement of nationalists. In a proposal for electoral reform in advance of the September 1998 national elections in Bosnia, the ICG has recommended a system of multiple voting designed to force parties to appeal to voters outside their natural constituency. Notwithstanding that integrationist aim, the ICG proposal requires electoral rolls and voter identity cards that mark ethnicity, and a guaranteed quota of seats for each ethnic group to be pre-determined by reference to the 1991 census (the same census which provided the data for the maps of each peace proposal up to and including Dayton). All this is justified on the basis that “the concept of separate ethnic identities is deeply rooted in Bosnian society. The identities were formed during more than four centuries of Ottoman rule . . . [and] have remained clearly defined into the late 20th century” (ICG, 1998b). Consistent with the assumptions about identity politics deployed by the peacemakers and the paramilitaries in Bosnia, the ICG’s political anthropology licenses the divisive policies it opposes.

**Remapping Bosnia**

What this and every other policy based on the same political anthropology overlooks is the more complex historical arrangement of identity politics in Bosnia revealed by ethnographic study. For example, Tone Bringa, 1995 (see also Sugar, 1977) demonstrates the lived experience of a non-territorial multiculturalism in Bosnia, derived in part from the *millet* system of the Ottoman empire. The *millet* system embodied deterritorialised identities and meant that different communities not only shared the same territory, they shared the same economic life and, despite religious differences and their disparate cosmologies, also shared many aspects of social life at the most prosaic of levels (Bringa, 1995:21). Bringa stresses that for modern Bosnia, difference was lived and negotiated on a daily basis:

To most Bosnians (and particularly to the post-World War II generations) difference in ethnoreligious affiliation was one of the many differences between people, like the differences between men and women, villager and city dweller. It was acknowledged and often joked about but it never precluded friendship. Indeed, for these Bosnians being Bosnian (*bosnanac*) meant growing up in a multicultural and multireligious environment, an environment where cultural pluralism was intrinsic to the social order. Dealing with cultural difference was part of people’s most immediate experience of social life outside the confines of their home, and it was therefore an essential part of their identity. In the village mutual acknowledgement of cultural diversity and coexistence was an intrinsic quality of life and people’s everyday experience, and therefore an important element in the process of individual identity formation (Bringa, 1995:83).
One had in the millet system and its legacies, therefore, a community of similarities and differences, experienced simultaneously on shared territory, which sometimes witnessed violent conflicts, but which more often than not managed a productive existence, especially through the informal institution of komšiluk or “good neighbourliness” (Bougarel, 1996). It thus embodied a mode of being which could not be easily understood in dichotomous terms as separate or mixed, or some straightforward combination of the two. That it was both of these at the same time (symbolised strikingly when it occasionally involved the shared celebration of religious days and combined use of sacred sites) meant it is more accurately understood in terms of the aporetic relations of identity/difference than any essentialist or reductionist notion.

Of course, the experiences of a war as violent as that in Bosnia makes a rapid return to the past by the populace as a whole unlikely. The alliance of paramilitaries, nationalists and peacemakers in a shared anthropological and political logic of identity means that those opposing the divisive strategies of partition face many powerful obstacles. But the task is not to take communal politics backwards; it is to appreciate the extent to which traces of this legacy persist in the present and can be fostered for the future. Recalling the idea of representation having a double function, the task is to recover that which has been made less imaginable through the violence associated with the nationalist imaginary.

What is remarkable about Bosnia is the extent to which even after the horrendous levels of violence, the desire for an integrated, non-nationalist future persists, and not just amongst the urban elites. Contrary to those analysts whose inflexible schemas see only the hardening of identities and positions, when free from nationalist pressures, the majority of displaced persons have indicated a willingness to reintegrate. With more than three-quarters of Bosniacs and Croats (but only one-quarter of Serbs) registering to vote according to their 1991 place of residence, and supporting agencies—such as the locally organised and multi-ethnic Coalition for Return—working to make it possible for refugees to return home, those most directly affected by the violence have demonstrated their intent (Bosco, 1998; ICG, 1998c, f). As Cousens (1997:817) notes,

Among international opponents to partition, the most persuasive are those who have contact with Bosnia at the community level. They do not describe a population ideologically committed to multi-ethnicity, but they do see a serious and widespread interest in resuming normal, safe and productive lives where questions of nationality are marginal.

These considerations were elided and foreclosed by diplomacy’s operation, especially in its reliance on the ethnographic cartography of Bosnia. The challenge, especially for critical geographers, is whether the mode of being detailed by Bringa (1995), or the new articulations of sovereignty and territory being proposed for an integrated post-Dayton Bosnia, can be mapped in ways that overcome the reductionist schemata of traditional cartography. Can, as Crampton (1996:358) desires, a “flexible and locally sensitive acknowledgement of multiethnicity”—in its hybrid, non-enclave form—be represented? Having challenged the empiricist–posi-
tivist strictures of traditional cartography, can critical perspectives develop “descriptive strategies capable of reconstructing the significance of a radically different spatial order” (Noyes, 1994:248)? These questions are posed without knowing an answer, albeit with the certainty that while new and different forms of mapping would be better, they would not in themselves be the answer.

Responding to this challenge involves more than the mechanics of literal mapping; it also requires a reconsideration of all the practices that problematise a place and its peoples in terms of the nationalist imaginary. In the context of Bosnia, this reassessment of the international community’s diplomatic problematisation of Bosnia is but one part. It needs an appreciation of the traditions of identity politics in Bosnia, which embody a multiculturalism that goes beyond the enclave multi-ethnicity of Dayton, as well as beyond partitionist and statist logics. And it then requires the development of strategies, policies and modes of representation which accommodate and foster the pluralisation of the possibilities of being on the same territory.

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